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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
WILFRED A. VIGIL JR., : Case No. 900166 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § § 78-2-2(3)(h) (1953 as amended) and Rule 26(c), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure whereby a criminal defendant charged 
with a first degree felony may appeal an interlocutory order to this 
Court after this Court has granted a petition for interlocutory 
review. This Court granted Mr. Vigil's "Petition for Permission to 
Appeal from Interlocutory Order" in an order dated June 28, 1990. 
See Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Can the State charge attempted depraved indifference 
homicide? This issue involves a question of law, and a correction 
of error standard applies. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The State filed a three-count Information against Wilfred 
Vigil on July 14, 1989. R. 6-9. After the case was bound over to 
Third District Court on all three counts, Appellant filed a "Motion 
to Dismiss and Amend" on January 11, 1990. R. 42-44. On March 23, 
1990, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered his Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order denying Appellant's motion. R. 74-77. 
See Addendum B. On April 12, 1990, Appellant filed his "Petition 
for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order" in this Court. 
R. 87-97. On June 28, 1990, this Court entered its Order granting 
Appellant's request for interlocutory review. 
Appellant has been granted a pretrial release and is free 
on bail pending the outcome of this appeal and his subsequent trial. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as amended) is set forth 
in pertinent part on page 4 of this brief. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1953 as amended) is set forth 
in pertinent part on page 6 of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In a three-count Information, the State charged Mr. Vigil 
with one count of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a 
first degree felony, and two counts of Attempted Criminal Homicide, 
Murder in the Second Degree, a second degree felony. R. 6-9. 
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In Count II of the Information, the State charged 
alternatively that Mr. Vigil either "intentionally or knowingly 
attempted to cause the death of Shane Hermanson" and/or "acting 
under circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human life, 
engaged in conduct with created a grave risk of death to another and 
thereby attempted to cause the death of Shane Hermansen." R. 7. 
In Count III, the State alleged only that Mr. Vigil, 
while "acting under circumstances evidencing depraved indifference 
to human life, engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of 
death to another, and thereby attempted to cause the death of Jeremy 
Malloy." 
In his Motion to Dismiss and Amend, Mr. Vigil requested 
that the trial court amend Count II by deleting the alternative 
which is underlined above, and dismiss Count III. R. 42. The trial 
court denied the motion. R. 74-5. See Addendum B containing trial 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Depraved indifference second degree homicide requires a 
knowing mental state, not a specific intent to kill. In order to be 
guilty of an attempt, an individual must intend to commit the target 
offense, i.e. intend to kill another person. Since depraved 
indifference second degree homicide does not require an intent to 




POINT. ATTEMPTED DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
HOMICIDE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CRIMINAL OFFENSE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as amended) proscribes 
Murder in the Second Degree. It provides: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder 
in the second degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes 
the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily 
injury to another, he commits an act 
clearly dangerous to human life that 
causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, he engages in conduct which 
creates a grave risk of death to another 
and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d) while in the commission, 
attempted commission, or immediate flight 
from commission or attempted commission 
of . . . , causes the death of another 
person other than the party as defined in 
Section 76-2-202. 
(emphasis added). 
In State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984), 
this Court pointed out that Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1) (c) "does 
not specify a particular mental state" and that the reference in 
that subsection to "'depraved indifference7 does not denote a 
subjective mental state." Instead, the term "depraved indifference" 
refers "to the objective circumstances under which the conduct 
causing the death occurred." Id. 
Because "depraved indifference second degree murder does 
not expressly specify a particular mental state" (Id. at 1045), this 
Court looked to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1953 as amended) in 
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determining the requisite mental state for depraved indifference 
murder. Id. at 1046. This Court held that the appropriate mental 
state for depraved indifference homicide is "knowingly" or with 
knowledge. Id. This Court stated: 
Thus, under our interpretation, the culpable 
mental state prescribed by statute for depraved 
indifference homicide is the sensible 
requirement that the defendant acted with 
knowledge that his conduct created a grave risk 
of death to another. (footnote omitted). 
Id. at 1047. 
In Fontana, this Court set forth the elements required to 
establish depraved indifference under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-203(1)(c): 
1. The defendant engaged in conduct that 
created a grave risk of death to another; and 
2. At the time he so acted, the defendant 
knew that his conduct created a grave risk of 
death to another; and 
3. The circumstances under which the 
defendant acted, objectively viewed by a 
reasonable man rather than subjectively by the 
actual state of defendant's mind, were such as 
to evidence a depraved indifference to human 
life; and 
4. The defendant thereby unlawfully 
caused the death of another. 
See also State v. Bolsinaer. 699 P.2d 1214, 1219 (Utah 1985). 
In Bolsinger, the Court reiterated that the requisite 
mens rea for depraved indifference is knowledge that the conduct 
created a grave risk of death to another. Id. In analyzing the 
meaning of the term "depraved indifference," this Court stated: 
To constitute depraved indifference, the act 
must be done 'which has been rather well 
understood at common law to involve something 
more serious than mere recklessness alone which 
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has had an incidental tragic result.7 
(citation omitted). There must be a knowing 
doing of an uncalled for act in callous 
disregard of its likely harmful effect on a 
victim, which is so heinous as to be equivalent 
to a "specific intent" to kill. (citation 
omitted). 
Id. at 1220. 
In State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), this 
Court again analyzed depraved indifference second degree homicide. 
This Court pointed out that the second degree homicide statute deals 
with forms of homicide that have a similar, very high degree of 
moral culpability. 
That culpability arises either from an actual 
intent to kill or from a mental state that is 
essentially equivalent thereto . . . 
Id. at 259. This Court clarified, however, that depraved 
indifference murder does not require a specific intent to kill; 
rather, it requires "a knowing doing of an uncalled for 
act . . . which is so heinous as to be equivalent to a 'specific 
intent' [or a purpose] to kill." Id. at 261, quoting Bolsinger, 699 
P.2d at 1220. 
Although depraved indifference murder requires a mental 
state that is equivalent to a specific intent to kill, a review of 
Utah case establishes that the requisite mens rea is "knowingly,fl 
and that a specific intent or purpose to cause the death of another 
is not a requirement for depraved indifference homicide. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1953 as amended) outlines the 
elements for attempt. It states in part: 
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(1) For purposes of this part a person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the offense, he 
engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
step toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct 
does not constitute a substantial step unless 
it is strongly corroborative of the actor's 
intent to commit the offense." 
(emphasis added). 
In State v. Harmon, 612 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986) 
(per curiam), this Court clarified that the elements of attempt 
include conduct by the defendant which "constituted a 'substantial 
step' toward commission of the offense and that the substantial step 
must be 'strongly corroborative' of defendant's intent to commit the 
offense. (footnote omitted)." (emphasis added). 
The emphasized language in both the statute and Harmon 
suggests that in order to be convicted of an attempt, the defendant 
must intend to commit the target offense. 
Utah cases which focus on the crimes of attempted second 
degree homicide or attempted manslaughter further demonstrate that a 
defendant must have an intent to commit the target offense, i.e. an 
intent to kill, in order to commit either crime. 
In State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 394 (Utah 1989), this 
Court held that "attempted felony-murder does not exist as a crime 
in Utah." This Court stated: 
The crime of attempted murder does not fit 
within the felony-murder doctrine because an 
attempt to commit a crime requires proof of an 
intent to consummate the crime, and numerous 
courts have held that the crime of attempted 
murder requires proof of intent to kill, 
(footnote omitted). 
- 7 -
In Bell, 785 P.2d at 394, this Court also stated: 
Indeed, in the face of logic, it is inescapable 
that the crime of attempted murder requires 
proof of intent to kill. 
Both State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978), and 
State v, Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), support Mr. Vigil's 
argument that an intent to kill is required in order to be guilty of 
attempted homicide. In Norman, 580 P.2d at 240, this Court held 
that attempted reckless manslaughter does not exist since the 
perpetrator must have an intent to commit the crime in order to be 
guilty of an attempt. In Howell, 649 P.2d at 94, this Court 
determined that because subparagraph (c) of the manslaughter statute 
requires an intent to kill, attempt under that subsection is a legal 
possibility. 
Case law from other jurisdictions also supports 
Mr. Vigil's argument that a defendant must intend to kill in order 
to be convicted of attempted homicide and that the knowing mental 
state required for depraved indifference homicide precludes an 
attempted homicide under that subsection. In reaching the decision 
in State v. Bell, 785 P.2d at 393, this Court relied on case law 
from "two other states with attempt statutes similar to Utah's 
[which] have determined that attempted murder requires a specific 
intent to kill." 
One of those cases, State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251 (Me. 
1984) did not involve a felony-murder version of homicide; rather, 
it involved a knowing mental state. The Huff court determined that 
for a person to be guilty of criminal attempt, he or she must have 
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"the intent to complete the target offense." In other words, 
"[b]efore a person can be convicted of attempted murder, he must act 
with the intent to cause the death of another human being. 
(citation omitted)." 469 A.2d at 1253. 
The Huff court pointed out that an actor cannot "intend 
to act 'knowingly7" and 
That "knowingly" is a distinct and less 
purposeful state of mind than 
intentionally . . . While either mental state 
may satisfy the murder statute, this does not 
commend them equally for purposes of the 
attempt statute. 
Huff. 469 A.2d at 1253. 
In People v. Mitchell. 424 N.E.2d 658 (111. App. 1981), 
cited by this Court in footnote 13 of State v. Bell. 785 P.2d at 
393, the Court stated: 
The offense of attempt (murder) requires the 
mental state of specific intent to commit 
murder. Knowledge that the consequences of an 
act may result in death or grave bodily injury, 
or intent to do bodily harm, is not enough, 
(citation omitted). 
Mitchell. 424 N.E.2d at 661. See also State v. Rodaers. 502 A.2d 
360, 366 (Conn. 1985) ("The mental state associated with the crime 
of attempt to commit murder is 'intent to cause the death of another 
person.7"); State v. Strother. 362 So.2d 508, 509 (La. 1978) 
(attempted first or second degree murder requires intent to kill 
another person); People v. Collie. 634 P.2d 534, 545 (Calif. 1981) 
("Specific intent to kill is a necessary element of attempted 
murder."). 
Although the trial judge was correct that depraved 
indifference second degree murder requires a mental state which is 
equivalent in moral culpability to a specific intent to kill, he was 
incorrect in concluding that attempted depraved indifference 
homicide is a legal possibility. Although the mental states are 
"equivalent" in terms of moral culpability, they are distinct in 
terms of factual requirements. Depraved indifference homicide does 
not require an actual or specific intent to kill; since the attempt 
statute and Utah case law require that an individual intend to 
commit the target offense, an attempted depraved indifference 
homicide cannot exist. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Vigil respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the order of the trial court, grant his Motion to Dismiss and Amend, 
and remand the case to the trial court with an order that Count III 
of the Information be dismissed and Count II be amended so as to 
delete the allegation that Mr. Vigil committed an attempted depraved 
indifference homicide. 
SUBMITTED this Ntt day of January, 1991. 
feRADSHAW 
for Defendant/Appellant 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this N-UL day of January, 1991. 
<JlMQ£ 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED by 
this day of January, 1991. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Regular May Term, 1990 June 28, 1990 
Tr. - ' J'.dicid District 
JUL 0 5 1990 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ^i^^^d^^Lf^ id£<l^ 
The State of Utah, V^ & ~--<^^ T Yx 
v. No. 900166 Deputy c m 
Wilfred Vigil, 891901033 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Appellant's petition for Interlocutory Appeal having 
been considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in 
the premises, it is ordered that an Interlocutory Appeal be, 
and the same is, granted as prayed. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
ADDENDUM B 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake Counby Attorney 
RICHARD G. MACDOUGALL, Bar No. 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84.111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
2039 
/-^ MAR 2 3 1990 
^MmLi&Jik 
isi^cs Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR., 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 891901033 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant Vigil's 
Motion to Dismiss and Amend; the Court heard arguments from counsel 
and reviewed memoranda submitted by the parties and being fully 
advised, makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant Vigil is charged in Count II of the 
Information with Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second 
Degree, based, in the alternative, on depraved indifference. 
Defendant Vigil is charged with the same offense in Count TTI based 
solely on depraved indifference. 
2. Defendant Vigil filed a motion to dismiss Count III 
and to dismiss a portion of Count II based on a claim that depraved 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 891901033 
Page two 
indifference murder does not require a mens rea involving an intent 
to kill. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The crime of Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder in 
the Second Degree, under §76-5-203(c), Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
as amended, requires proof of a mens rea which is the equivalent of 
a specific intent to kill and which is distinguishable from 
recklessness. 
2. Defendant Vigil's Motion to Dismiss and Amend 
should be denied. 
DATED this ^S* —day of March, 1990 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to Form: 
sc/0077/78159 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RICHARD G. MACDOUGALL, Bar No 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
2039 
J [ M O J'JvS C.wl ^'JvHiiOl 
By. CSpcty Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR., 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Case No. 891901033 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant Vigil's 
Motion to Dismiss and Amend; the Court heard arguments of counsel 
and reviewed memoranda submitted by the parties; the Court, having 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Vigil's Motion to 
Dismiss and Amend is denied. 
DATED this ^ ? —day of March, 1990. 
Approved as to Form: 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE RAYMONP r>. HMO 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDG*7 
sc/0077/78159 
State v. Wilfred A. Vigil, Jr. 
Case No. 891901033 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 51 day of March, 1990, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order to NANCY BERGESON, Attorney for 
Defendant, at the address stated below. 
NANCY BERGESON, ESQ. 
Attorney for the Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
sc/0077 
